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Don't Be Shocked if Missouri
Applies Strict Products Liability
to Electricity, But Should It?
Monroe v. SavannahElectric & PowerCo.'
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1986, the Missouri Court of Appeals expressly chose not to decide
whether strict products liability should be applied to electricity provided by an
electric utility.2 In Monroe v. SavannahElectric & Power Co., the Supreme
Court of Georgia answered this question and held that electricity is a product for
strict products liability purposes? The Georgia Supreme Court further found that
the two critical factors in determining whether electricity is sold are its
marketable condition and the manufacturer's relinquishment of exclusive control
over the electricity.'
Inevitably, Missouri and other states which have not considered whether
electricity is a product for strict products liability purposes, will have to decide
the issue. The resolution of the issue is important because electricity causes
approximately 1700 deaths and $950,000,000 in property loss each year.'
H1. FACTS AND HOLDING
Monroe's decedent, Scott Ussery (hereinafter "Ussery"), was towing a
shrimp boat to a dock when a metal pole came into contact with an overhead
power line that supplied the dock with electricity.6 Savannah Electric and Power
Company (hereinafter "Savannah") owned the power line.7 When Ussery
stepped out of the vehicle, the electricity "grounded" through his body, killing
Ussery." The fuses installed by Savannah had not blown.9 Neither party
disputed that thke electricity had not yet passed through the meter at the dock."0

1. 471 S.E.2d 854 (Ga. 1996).
2. Hills v. Ozark Border Elec. Coop., 710 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
3. Monroe, 471 S.E.2d at 856.
4.Id.
5. Roger W. Holmes, Note, Strict Products Liability For Electric Utility
Companies: A Surge in The Wrong Direction, 29 SuFFoiK U. L. REv. 161, 161 n.1
(1995).
6. Monroe, 471 S.E.2d at 855.
7. Id
8. Id
9. Id
10. Id
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Monroe sued Savannah on a strict products liability claim." Monroe
argued that the electricity had been "sold" within the meaning of Georgia's strict
liability statute because it had been delivered to the consumer's property for
use.' 2 On the other hand, Savannah argued that the electricity had not been sold
because it had not passed through the electric power meter at the dock.1 The
trial court held that, even ifthe electricity were a "product" within the meaning
of Georgia's strict liability statute, the electricity had not been sold because it
had not passed through the meter at the dock."' Therefore, the trial court granted
Savannah's motion for partial summary judgment on the strict liability claim.'
The court of appeals affined, holding that electricity could be considered a
"product" within the meaning of Georgia's strict liability statute, but because the
electricity had not passed through the electric power meter, there had been no
sale as required by the statute. 6
The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to consider the questions
of (1) whether electricity is a product within the meaning of Georgia's strict7
liability statute, and (2) if so, at what point the utility has sold the electricity.'
The Supreme Court held that electricity was a product within the meaning of
Georgia's strict liability statute, 8 and that the manufacturer's relinquishment of
exclusive control over the electricity and the useable or marketable condition of

11. Id
12. Monroe v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 465 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ga. Ct. App.
1995). GA. CODEANN. § 51-1-11(b)(1) (Supp. 1996) provides that:
[t]he manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property directly or
through a dealer or any other person shall be liable in tort, ... to any natural
person who may use, consume, or reasonably be affected by the property and
who suffers injury... because the property when sold by the manufacturer

was not merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended, and its
condition when sold is the proximate cause ofthe injury sustained.
13. Monroe, 465 S.E.2d at 509.
14. Id
15. Id
16. Monroe, 471 S.E.2d at 855.
17. Id. at 855. The court expressly passed on the question of when electricity
contains a defect. Id. at 855 n.1.
18. Id at 855-56. (citing Bryant v. Tri County Elec. Membership Corp., 844
F. Supp. 347, 349 (W.D. Ky. 1994); Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 275
N.W.2d 641, 643 (Wis. 1979); Elgin Airport Inn, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 410
N.E.2d 620, 624 (I1. App. Ct. 1980)). The Georgia Supreme Court also noted that
electricity has been deemed a product not merely because it can be produced, confined,
controlled, transmitted and distributed into a stream of commerce, but also because "it
is artificially manufactured, can be measured, bought and sold, changed in quantity or
quality, delivered wherever desired and is subject to larceny.' Id. at 855 (quoting Elgin,
410 N.E.2d at 624).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/5
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the electricity are the two essential factors in determining whether the electricity
has been sold. 19 Because the evidence established that the two critical factors
were absent, the court further held that the electricity had not been sold within
the meaning of the Georgia strict liability statute.20
H. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Negligence as the Standardof TortLiabilityfor an Electric
Company Before the Advent ofStrict ProductsLiabilityl
Before strict products liability existed, courts used negligence analysis to
the determine the liability of an electric utility." Generally, to succeed on a

19. Id.at 856-57. The court refused to adopt the bright line rule that electricity is
sold when it has passes through the electric meter for purposes of determining the amount
of electricity sold to the consumer. Id.
20. Id.at 857. The court accordingly affirmed thejudgment ofthe court ofappeals.
Id. The court noted that the evidence established that the electricity was in an
unmarketable state at the time of the electrocution, that ioconsumer at the dock (or
anyone who might reasonably and foreseeably be expected to encounter the electricity)
had yet controlled the electricity, and Savannah had not relinquished its exclusive control
over it. Id.at 856.
21. Plaintiffs have also used claims of strict liability based on abnormally
dangerous behavior and claims of strict warranty liability against electric utilities. See
Holmes, supranote 5,at 167-75. Courts have generally refused to apply strict liability
based on abnormally dangerous behavior to electric utilities. Id. at 174. See, e.g.,
G & K Dairy v. Princeton Elec. Plant Bd., 781 F. Supp. 485,490 (W.D. Ky. 1991); Wirth
v. Mayrath Indus., 278 N.W.2d 789, 793-94 (N.D. 1979). But, some courts have held
that electricity can be subject to warranty liability after it passes through the meter.
Holmes, supra note 5 at 168-69. See, e.g., Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 278
N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind.Ct. App. 1972).
22. See Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Lum, 262 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Ark. 1953)
(there can be no recovery against an electric company in the absence of a breach of some
duty owing to the injured person); Naki v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 442 P.2d 55, 57 (Haw.
1968) (court required fault, specifically that defendant electric company owed the
plaintiff a duty and failed to fulfill that duty, in order for defendant to be liable for
furnishing electricity); Weissert v. City of Escanaba, 299 N.W. 139, 143 (Mich. 1941)
(holding that liability of an electric company is governed by the principles ofnegligence,
and no iability to respond in damages will attach in the absence ofnegligence on the part
ofthe company or its employees); Martin v. Northern States Power Co., 72 N.W.2d 867,
870 (Minn. 1955) (the liability of a purveyor of electricity is grounded in negligence);
Hamilton v. Laclede Elec. Coop., 294 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1956) (liability of an electric
utility rests upon negligence); Hall v. Loraine-Medina Elec. Coop., Inc., 148 N.E.2d 232,
234 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (while an electric company is liable for its negligence, it is not
an insurer of the safety of those who come in contact with its wires); Havron v.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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negligence claim, the plaintiff must show a breach of duty owed to another
which causes damage to the other.P Courts have applied the negligence
doctrines of proximate causation, 24 contributory negligence,2 and res ipsa
loquitor, to electric utilities. Regarding the breach of duty element of a
negligence action, courts have often assigned electric utilities a higher degree of
care commensurate with their dangerous activities. Similarly, courts have also
imposed specific duties upon electric utilities, including a duty to inspect and
maintain their power lines, a duty to isolate or insulate transmission lines when

Sequachee Valley Elec. Coop., 204 S.W.2d 823, 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947) (distributor
of electric current will not be held liable without negligence); See also, Manaa v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 268 F.2d 793, 797 (4th Cir. 1959); Hale v..Montana-Dakota
Util. Co. 192 F.2d 274,276 (8th Cir. 1951) (electric company owes a duty commensurate
with the danger involved, but is not insurer); Alabama Power Co. v. Berry, 48 So. 2d,
231, 234 (Ala. 1950); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Brinson, 67 So. 2d 407,410 (Fla.
1953); LeMaitre v. Union Elec. Power Co., 73 N.E.2d 125, 127 (111. App. Ct. 1947);
Kentucky Util. Co. v. Young, 247 S.W.2d 978, 979 (Ky. 1952); Calton v. Louisiana
Power &Light Co., 56 So. 2d 862,865 (La. Ct. App. 1952); Edgarton v. H.P. Welch Co.,
74N.E.2d 674,678 (Mass. 1947); Henson v. Washington Water Power Co., 5 P.2d 1025,
1027 (Wash. 1931).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS SECTION 281 (1965).
24. See, e.g., Weissert,299 N.W. at 143 (in determining the liability of an electric
company for personal injury, as in other negligent actions, the test for proximate
causation is whether the accident might have reasonably been foreseen by a person of
ordinary intelligence and prudence); Sizemore v. Montana Power Co., 803 P.2d 629,635
(1990) (holding that the determination of proximate cause is based upon whether the
consequences of the breach were reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, and noting
that an electric company cannot be liable absent proximate cause).
25. See, e.g., Hale, 192 F.2d at 278 (barring recovery when plaintiff was carrying
rod and failed to shorten it or keep it on one side of electrical wires); Hamilton, 294
S.W.2d at 17 (barring recovery because of plaintiff's contributory negligence in failing
to pay attention to wires and not taking any precautions to prevent contact with wires);
Hanson, 5 P.2d at 1027 (boy climbing fence and electric tower held contributorily
negligent when electrocuted by power lines).
26. See Louis Lawrence Boyle, Electrifying Solutions for the Shocking and
DisparateTreatment ofElectricity Within ProductsLiabilityLaw, Comment, 93 DICK.

L. REV. 851, 866-67 (1989) (noting that the three requirements for proving res ipsa
loquitor are that: (1) the event must be one which does not ordinarily occur in the
absence of negligence; (2) the damage must be caused by an agent or instrumentality
within the exclusive control ofthe defendant; and (3)the damage must not have been due
to any voluntary action or contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff). Boyle
also notes that plaintiffs have turned to res ipsa loquitor in actions against electric
companies because of difficulties in proving causation. Id at n.108; See Holmes, supra
note 5, at 167. See, e.g., Read v. Southern Pine Elec. Power Ass'n, 515 So. 2d 916, 920
(Miss. 1987) (applying res ipsa loquitur to electric utility).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/5

4

Petri: Petri: Don't Be Shocked If Missouri Applies Strict Products Liability to Electricity

19971

STRICTPRODUCTSLIABILITY

persons may foreseeably come in contact with them, and a duty to warn the
public of any foreseeable danger in contacting power lines. 7
B. The MajorityPositionandIts Rationale-Electricityis a Product
for Strict ProductsLiabilityPurposess
In 1965, the Second Restatement of Torts, which included Section 402A,
SpecialLiabilityofSeller ofProductforPhysicalHarm to User or Consumer,29
was adopted. Since then, jurisdictions have struggled with the issue of whether
electricity is a product for strict products liability purposes3
The first court to deem electricity a product for strict products liability
purposes was the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Ransome v. Wisconsin Electric
Power Co.3 1 In Ransome, an electricity overload destroyed the plaintiffs

27. Holmes, siqianote 5,at 163-64. National electrical safety standards also can
provide a means for establishing the requisite duty of care. Holmes, supranote 5, at 165.
See also Boyle, supra note 26, at 865-66.
28. Electricity has been held to be a "good" for warranty actions. Holmes, supra
note 5 at 168. See, e.g., Hevey, 278 N.E.2d at 610. Courts have also held electricity to
be "property" or a "commodity" for other types of actions. Holmes, supranote 5, at 17677. See Boyle, supra note 26, at 853, 855. See, e.g., City ofKirkwood v. Union Elec.
Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1181-82 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983)
(holding electricity to be a commodity under the Robinson-Patman Act); People v.
Menagas, I1 N.E.2d 403, 407 (Il1.1937) (holding that electricity is within an Illinois
larceny statute); but the focus of Monroe and of this note is whether electricity is a
product for strict products liability purposes.
29. Section 402A reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1)applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMm (SECOND) OF TORTs SECTION 402A (1965).
30. See infra the text accompanying notes 31-61. See also Holmes, supra note 5,
at 175; Boyle, supranote 26, at 855; Earnest Baynard, Should StrictProductsLiability
Apply to the Sale ofElectricity?, 55 TENN. L. REV. 317, 320-21 (1988).
31. Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641,648 (Wis. 1979).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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house. 2 The defendant electric power company argued that, as a general matter,
strict liability in tort should not apply to the sale of electricity?3 The court held
that while the distribution of electricity might be a service, the electricity, in and
of itself, is a consumable product 4 Although the court noted the social policy
justifications for strict products liability,3 it based its decision on the notion that
electricity is "a form of energy that can be made or produced by men, confined,
controlled, transmitted, and distributed... ,,36 Many courts have followed the
"produced, controlled, transmitted rationale" of Ransome.37
Within the majority that considers electricity a product for strict products
liability purposes, there are jurisdictions which use a different rationale than that
used in Ransome. These courts have made their decision based on public policy

32. Id. at 643.
33. Id. at 647. The court noted that the defendant's argument was based upon
Kemp v. Wisconsin ElectricPower Co., 172 N.W.2d 161 (1969). However, the court

noted that in Kemp the plaintiff had touched an electrical power line but was denied
recovery because the electricity had not been sold. Ransome, 275 N.W.2d at 647.
Therefore, the court characterized the defendant's reliance upon Kemp as mistaken
because Kemp implies that electricity is a product which can be sold for strict products
liability purposes. Id. at 647-48.
34. Id. at 643.
35. Id. at 647.

36. Id. at 643.
37. See Smith v. Home Light &Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Colo. 1987)
("[S]uffice it to say [electricity] is a form of energy that can be made or produced by
men, confined, [and] controlled .... "(quoting Ransome, 275 N.V.2d at 648)); Carbone
v. Connecticut Light &Power Co., 482 A.2d 722,723-24 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (citing
Ransome and holding that as a matter of law a strict products liability complaint in which
electricity was the product could not be stricken as not stating a proper cause of action);
Aversav. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 451 A.2d 976,979-80 (N. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1982) (noting the produced, controlled, moved rationale of both Ranrome and Elgin, and
holding that electricity is a product for strict products liability purposes); Schriner v.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 501 A.2d 1128, 1132-33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
(quoting Ransome and agreeing that electricity can be a product within the meaning of
Section 402A); Houston Lighting &Power Co. v. Reynolds 765 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex.
1988) ("We agree with the better reasoned jurisdictions which hold electricity to be a
product. Electricity is a commodity, which like other goods can be manufactured,
transported and sold."); see also,Elgin Airport Inn, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,
432 N.E.2d 259, 262 (I11.1982) (Supreme Court of Illinois chose not to reach the
question of whether electricity was a product, but reversed the appellate court, which had
stated in Elgin AirportInn, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Cb., 410 N.E.2d 620, 624 (111.

App. Ct. 1980), that "[Having in mind that electrical energy is artificially manufactured,
can be measured, bought and sold, changed in quantity, delivered wherever desired ...
we are of the opinion that it is a product with the meaning of section 402A .... ").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/5
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considerations?' For example, Piercev. PacificGas & ElectricCo. is a leading
case using public policy analysis to justify the application of strict products
liability to electricity. In Pierce, electricity supplied by the Pacific Gas and
Electric Company (hereinafter"PG & F") shocked the plaintiff?9 The plaintiff
brought an action alleging strict liability in tort for defective products.4 The
defendant argued that electricity is merely the motion of charged ions rather than
a product.4 1 The court stated that "[w]e readily acknowledge that PG & E's
liability should not depend simply upon whether electricity is or is not labeled
a 'product.' More significantly, we believe the policy justifications for strict
'
liability in tort support its imposition in this case."42
The court then identified four grounds for strict products liability: (1) to
provide a "short-cu" to liability where negligence may be present but difficult
to prove; (2) to provide an economic incentive for improved product safety; (3)
to induce the reallocation of resources toward safer products; and (4) to spread
the risk of loss among all persons who use the product.4 3 The court then applied
the four factors to the situation at hand. Regarding the "short-cu' in proving
negligence, the court noted that the plaintiff would have to put on technical
evidence far beyond the knowledge of the average juror; therefore, the plaintiffs
would need to employ expert testimony.4 s However, the expert witnesses who
can explain the technical aspects of electricity systems are concentrated within
the industry itself and may be reluctant to serve as witnesses on the plaintiff's
behalf.' Regarding the incentive for improved economic safety, the court noted
that, especially in a case where a huge surge in electricity is traced to a defective
transformer, imposition of strict products liability provides an incentive for
utilities to avoid accidents before they occur by investing in safer products4

38. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
39. Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283, 285 (Ct. App. 1985).
40. Id
41. Id at 288-90.
42. Id at 291.
43. Id
44. Id at 291-92. It is important to note that in Pierce,the surge in electricity was
traceable to a defective transformer. Pierce,212 Cal. Rptr. at 291. However, California
courts subsequent to the Pierce decision have held electricity to be a product, even when
there was no evidence of defective electrical equipment. See Mancuso v. Southern Cal.
Edison Co., 283 Cal. Rptr. 300, 308 (Ct. App. 1991). In Mancuso,the court cited both
Ransome and Pierceand held that electricity supplied by electric company is a product.
The court reviewed the public policy analysis of Pierceand held that lightning generated
electricity is not a product because it has not been marketed or placed in the stream of
commerce by the electric company. Id.at 306-09.
45. Pierce,212 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 291-92.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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Finally, regarding the spreading ofthe risk of loss to all users of the product, the
court noted that "strict liability in tort spreads the costs of personal injuries
among millions of consumers of electricity instead of imposing those costs upon
blameless victims chosen by chance.""
Other courts have used policy analysis similar to that ofPierceto conclude
that electricity is a product,4 9 while still other courts have concluded that
electricity is a product for strict products liability purposes based on case law
dealing with electricity in other causes of action

C. The Minority PositionandIts Rationale-ElectricityIs a Service
for StrictProductsLiabilityPurposes
Representative of the cases which have declined to hold that electricty is a
product for strict liability purposes is Otte v. DaytonPower & Light Co. In Otte,
stray voltage coming from Dayton Power and Light Company's (hereinafter
"DP&L") wires harmed the plaintiff's cowsOs The plaintiffs sued DP&L for
strict products liability, interalia 2
The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the application of strict products liability
on alternate rationales.P First, the court reasoned that electricity is not a product
within the meaning of section 402A ofthe Second Restatement:5

48. Id.
49. See Bryant v. Tri-County Elec. Membership Corp., 844 F. Supp. 347, 352
(W.D. Ky. 1994) (holding that Kentucky courts would probably conclude that imposing
strict liability upon electric utilities would advance the policies of spreading risk among
all product consumers and discouraging the sale of defective goods).
50. See Petroski v. Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 354 N.E.2d 736, 747 (Ind. Ct. App.
1976) ("Electricity is a product which can be sold within the meaning of Section 402A.").
The Petroskicourt cited Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 278 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. Ct. App.
1972). Petroski,354 N.E.2d at 747. TheHelvey court held that electricity was a"good"
within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code because electricity was an existing
thing that was movable. Helvey, 278 N.E.2d at 610.
51. Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 835, 836 (Ohio 1988).
"Neutral to earth voltage [referred to as stray voltage] is the measurement at any given
time and place of electricity trying to return from where it came, either through the earth
or through the primary neutral wire.... [s]ometimes, because of changes in resistance
on the primary neutral, electricity returning home from one user will get offthe primary
neutral onto another user's secondary neutral, ground itself and then return home through
the earth." Id. "[S]tray voltage is a normal and natural condition which is common to
every power distribution system in this country." Id. at 839.
52. Id.at 837.
53. Id. at 838.

54. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/5

8

Petri: Petri: Don't Be Shocked If Missouri Applies Strict Products Liability to Electricity
STRICT PRODUCTSLIABILITY

19971

A "product' is anything made by human industry or art. Electricity appears
to fail
outside this definition. This is so because electricity is the flow of
electrically charged particles along a conductor. DP & L does not
manufacture electrically charged particles, but rather, sets in motion the
necessary elements that allow the flow of electricity. What we have here is
a purported defect in a distribution system. Such a system is, in our view, a
service 5
Secondly, the court reasoned that the public policies supporting strict
liability are not viable in an action against a highly regulated public utility.m The
court noted that the risk allocation and cost spreading rationales are only
applicable when the industry affected may pass its costs on to the general
public.' The court reasoned that the rationales would not be effective for a
public utility which may only establish price increases after getting
administrative approval. 5 The court conceded that strict products liability can
create an incentive for safer products. Nonetheless, the court concluded that it
was doubtful that the imposition of strict liability would lead to a safer
distribution system because public utilities already'are regulated by the National
Electric Safety Code (NESC). 5 9
New York, for one, has extended the dual rationale of Otte to non-stray
voltage situations. Otherjurisdictions, while not analyzing the properties of
electricity nor the strict products liability policies, have, in a perfunctory fashion,
declined to apply strict liability to electric companies. 6' Finally, some
jurisdictions, while not making a broad holding, have declined to apply strict
products liability to electric utilities in specific situations.62

55. Id. The court then went on to give reasons why, especially in a stray voltage
case, electricity is not a product. Id.
56. Otte, 523 N.E.2d at 841.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 842.
60. See Bowen v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 590 N.Y.S.2d 628,631-32 (App.
Div. 1992) (extending the dual rationale of Otte to situations involving voltage that is not

stray).
61. See Rodgers v. Chimney Rock Pub. Power Dist, 345 N.W.2d 12, 15-16 (Neb.
1984) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that electricity is a product for strict liability
purposes); Wood v. Public Serv. Co., 317 A.2d 576, 579-80 (N.H. 1974) ("No
compelling reason ofpolicy or logic has been advanced to apply strict liability to electric
companies.").
62. See G & K Dairy v. Princeton Elec. Plant Bd., 781 F. Supp. 485, 489 (W.D.
Ky. 1991) (holding that electricity is a service in a stray voltage situation). Bryant later
limited G & KDairyto stray voltage situations, Bryant v. Tri-County Elec. Membership
Corp., 844 F. Supp. 347,351 (W.D. Ky. 1994). See also Martinez v. Grant County Pub.
Util., 851 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) ("Washington recognizes the societal
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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D. Providedthat ElectricityIs a Productfor StrictProducts
LiabilityPurposes,at What PointHas the
Utility Sold the Electricity?
Although the Second Restatement calls for a sale of a product in order for
strict products liability to apply,63 most courts hold that strict products liability

necessity of transmitting lethal amounts of electricity through uninsulated power lines
through rural areas; it does not impose strict liability on electrical power companies for
injuries arising out of contact with those power lines:); Koplin v. Pioneer Power & Light
Co., 453 N.W.2d 214,219 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that Ransome is inapplicable
in a case dealing with stray voltage and agreeing with the Otte reasoning that stray
voltage is not a product).
63. Section 402A reads "One who sells any product in a defective
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/5
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is applicable to electricity when the utility places the electricity into the stream
of commerce.' But whether courts use "sale" or "stream of commerce"
language, the important determination to be made is the point in the distribution
system at which electricity will be subject to strict products liability.
A plurality ofjurisdictions have followed Ransome and held that electricity
is sold (or placed into the stream of commerce) when it enters the customer's
meter.& However, otherjurisdictions have used a variety of tests." In Smith v.
Home Light & Power Co., the court used a consumable or marketable voltage
test' The plaintiffs argued that once the electricity entered the distribution line
which terminated at their dairy barn, the utility had released it into the stream of
commerce."' The court rejected this argument reasoning that because the
electricity had not yet passed through the electric company's transformer, which
reduced the 7200 volt power to a level suitable for use in the dairy farm, the
utility had not sold the electricity.69 The court in Petroski v.IndianaPublic
Service Co. enunciated another test: electricity is not in the stream of commerce
until it reaches its destination in a home or factory.7 Perhaps the most

condition.., is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS SECTION 402A (1965).
64. Holmes, supranote 5,at 189; Petroski v. Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 354 N.E.2d
736, 747 (Ind.Ct. App. 1976) (holding that the test is not whether there has been a
technical sale, but rather whether the product has been placed in the stream of
commerce); See, e.g., Smith v. Home Light & Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Colo.
1987); Aversav. Public Serv.Elec. & Gas Co., 451 A.2d 976, 980 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1982); Schriner v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 501 A.2d 1128, 1133 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985).
65. Ransome, 275 N.W.2d at 643 ("[E]Iectricity leaves control of Wisconsin
Electric Power Company at the point in distribution system where a customer's
conductors are connected to the company's conductors, namely at the electric meter....
'[s]ale' of electricity takes place at the meter... -"); Bryant v. Tri-County Elec.
Membership Corp., 844 F. Supp. 347, 352 (W.D. Ky. 1994). Schriner v. Pennsylvania
Power & Light Co., 501 A.2d 1128, 1134 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). See RESTATEMENT
(TH D)OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LrAmLITY § 4 at cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13,
1995), which indicates that a majority of courts hold that electricity is a product when it
passes through the customer's meter. But cf.,
SmithBower v. Southwest Cen. Rural Elec.
Coop. Inc., 542 A.2d 140, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that plaintiffs could not
collect on strict products liability action because the electricity had not reached the meter
of the building near where the plaintiff's were moving farm equipment, even though the
electricity had been sold from an electric utility to an electric cooperative before reaching
the plaintiffs).
66. See infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
67. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
68. Smith, 734 P.2d at 1055.
69. Id.
70. Petroski, 354 N.E.2d at 747. In Petroski, a boy had touched an electrical
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unfavorable test to electric utilities was given in Houston Lighting & Power Co.
v. Reynolds1 The court held that electricity in the process of being delivered to
the consumer through the power company's transmission lines is in the stream
of commerceO2
Other courts have applied less precise tests." For example, in Aversa v.
PublicService Electric & Gas Co., the court chose not to apply a strict meter test
and held that "evidence that an electric company relinquished exclusive control
over its product may establish strict liability at a point prior to its running
through a meter where charges are computed."7 4 Finally, some courts have used
a combination of the above tests' 5 In PublicService Indiana,Inc. v. Nichols, the
court held that, in order for electricity to be released into the stream of
commerce, it had to reach its destination in a home or factory and had to be
reduced from a transmission voltage to a consumption voltage.76

distribution wire located in the upper branches of a tree. I at 739. Because this
electricity had clearly not reached its destination in a home or factory, the case offers no
insight as to specifically when or where electricity must reach its destination in a home
or factory.
71. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
72. Houston Lighting &Power Co. v. Reynolds 765 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1988) (the
court noted that once electricity is in the transmission lines it cannot be recalled or
restored).
73. See infranote 74 and accompanying text.
74. Aversa v. Public Serv. Elec. &Gas Co., 451 A.2d 976, 980 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1982) (the court then remanded the case for fact finding regarding the sale of
the electricity). For the subsequent development of California law on this issue see
Piercev. Pacific Gas &Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283,283 (Ct. App. 1985) (stating that
in most cases for electricity to be sold, "it must be delivered to the consumer's premises,
to the point where it is metered, although the many variations in electrical systems
prevent our drawing a 'bright line' at a particular point); Mancuso v. Southern Cal.
Edison Co., 283 Cal. Rptr. 300, 308 (Ct. App. 1991) ("T]he test is whether the
electricity has been metered."); Stein v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 907,
910 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating that "although passing through the customer's meter will
generally indicate when electricity has been sold there are other ways electricity may be
found to have left the control of the utility company.., we... decline to delineate the
particular point at which it can be said that electricity enters the stream of commerce,"
and holding that when electricity had blown up meter before a sale could be registered,
the electricity had entered the stream of commerce).
75. See infranote 76 and accompanying text.
76. Public Serv. Ind., Inc. v. Nichols, 494 N.E.2d 349, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
See Houston Lighting and Powerv. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784, 785-86 (Tex. 1988),
where the court appears to combine the consumable voltage test with the meter test by
holding that contact with overhead power lines does not come within the purview of
Section 402A and indicating that until the process of transforming the electricity from
35,000 volts to 110-220 volts "was completed, the electricity was not transferred from
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/5
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IV. INSTANT DECISION

In Monroe v. Savannah Electric & Power Co., 7 the Supreme Court of
Georgia adopted the majority position that electricity is a product for strict
products liability purposes7 8 After noting that the question was one of first
impression in Georgia, the court held that electricity is a product because it "can
be produced, confined, controlled, transmitted and distributed in the stream of

commerce' 9 and because it is "artificially manufactured, can be measured,
bought and sold, changed in quantity or quality, delivered wherever desired and
[is subject to larceny]. 8 0 The court expressly rejected the reasoning of Otte v.
Dayton Power & Light Co.81
Regarding the point at which electricity may be considered sold for strict
products liability purposes, the court rejected a rigid meter test. 2 Instead, the
court held that the two factors which determine whether electricity is sold for
strict products liability purposes are whether the manufacturer has relinquished
exclusive control over the product and whether the product is in a useable or

marketable condition. 3
In applying the law to the facts, the court noted that the evidence
established that, at the point where Ussery came into contact with the electricity,

HL & P's transmission line through a meter to the lines of a customer."
77. 471 S.E.2d 854 (Ga. 1996).

78. Id. See also infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
79. Monroe, 471 S.E.2d at 855 (quoting Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co.,
275 N.W.2d 641,643 (Wis. 1979)).
80. Id. (quoting Elgin Airport Inn, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 410 N.E.2d
620, 624 (111. App. Ct. 1980)).
81. Id. at 855-56. In Otte, the court reasoned that electricity was not a product
because it was not manufactured, and the court also reasoned that applying strict product
liability to electricity would be unwise on policy grounds. Otte, 523 N.E.2d at 838, 841842.
82. Monroe, 471 S.E.2d at 856. The court therefore refused to join the plurality
which holds that electricity is sold only when it reaches the customer's meter. See supra
note 65 and accompanying text.
83. Id. at 856-57. The court did not indicate whether this was a conjunctive or
disjunctive analysis. By using the marketable condition of the electricity and the
manufacturer's exclusive control as the two critical factors, it appears that the court is
combining the reasoning ofAversa and Smith. InAversa, the court stated "evidence that
an electric company relinquished exclusive control over its product may establish strict
liability at a point prior to its running through a meter where charges are computed."
Aversa v. Public Serv. Elec. &Gas Co., 451 A.2d 976, 980 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1982). In Smith, the court held that electricity is not sold until it is reduced to a suitable
voltage for consumption. Smith v. Home Light & Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1055
(Colo. 1987).
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it had already passed through one transformer at the edge of the property;
however, despite this initial step-down in voltage, the electricity was electrical
energy in an unmarketable state and unmarketed state." The evidence further
established that the electricity that Ussery encountered was not under the
exclusive control of any consumer at the dock or anyone who reasonably and
foreseeably might have been expected to encounter it.85 In addition, the evidence
demonstrated that Savannah had not relinquished its exclusive control over the
electricity. Given the absence of these two critical factors, the court held that
the electricity was not sold for strict products liability purposes and affirmed the
judgment of the appellate court. 87

V. COMMENT
The court in Carbonev. ConnecticutLight & Power Co. was correct when
it stated, "[]n considering whether electricity is a 'product' within the products
liability statute... the issue is not so much semantic, but rather
the underlying social policy as whether the doctrine of strict [products] liability
...should be made available to one sustaining social damage as a result of...
electric voltage ..., 8
The Ransome rationale that electricity is a product because electric utilities
can produce, control, and transmit it 9 is unpersuasive. Likewise, the Otte
rationale that electricity is not a product because electricity is merely the flow of
electrically charged particles along a conductor, which the electric company does
not manufacture, but merely sets in motion, is equally unpersuasive 0 Instead,
courts should focus on whether the application of strict products liability to
electricity would serve the public policies that the doctrine of strict products
liability was created to address.

84. Id. at 857.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. Because the electricity had not been sold, the court refused to reach the
question of whether the electricity had a defect. Id. at 855. Courts have had trouble
deciding what makes electricity defective. See Holmes, supranote 5 at 179-80. Some
courts have held that electricity which reaches a customer's meter at an abnormally high
voltage is defective while others have focused on whether the electricity reached the
consumer as the electric utility intended. See Holmes, supranote 5 at 181-82.
88. Carbone v. Connecticut Light &Power Co., 482 A.2d 722, 723 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1984).
89. Ransome, 275 N.W.2d at 643.
90. Otte,523 N.E.2d at 838. The courts in Ransome and Otte seem to be quibbling
over the meaning of the word "manufacture." Rather than quibbling over abstract
definitions, the issue should be decided using policy analysis.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/5
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Proponents of strict products liability believe that it increases social utility
by satisfying the following main objectives: promoting loss spreading,
discouraging consumption of hazardous products, and encouraging investment
in product safety?' Applying strict products liability to electricity does not serve
any of these objectives. 2
The regulation of public utilities diminishes the effectiveness of loss
spreadingP Loss spreading is predicated on the notion that manufacturers are
able to pass on increased insurance costs by raising the prices of products.' All
fifty states and the District of Columbia have commissions with regulatory
authority over public utilities. 9 These state commissions function as retail ratesetters.9 Nearly every state statute governing public utility rates requires the
establishment of just and reasonable rates.97 Specifically, state statutes give
commissions the power to require electric utilities to file rate schedule changes
which are subject to the approval ofthe commissions." Given the burdens ofthe
administrative process and the discretion of the commissions to reject rate
increases, "manufacturers" of electricity will not be able to raise their prices as
easily as manufacturers in the free market. 9
States generally grant public utilities limited monopoly status."° Public
utilities' status as monopolies undermines the objective of discouraging
consumption of hazardous products.'
Strict products liability reduces the
consumption of hazardous products by increasing the prices of risky products,

91. James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping With the Time Dimension in Products
Liability,69 CAL. L.REv. 919,931-32 (1981). Henderson also asserts that reducing the
transaction costs of operating the accident reparation system is an objective of strict
products liability. The rationale is that the cost of lawsuits will decrease because the
plaintiffwil not have to prove negligence. Id. at 931, 933. Aside from these economic
rationales, Henderson notes that courts have often justified strict products liability based
upon fairness. However, Henderson indicates that the issue offairness is more applicable
to a negligence action, and that the allocation ofaccident losses to producers irrespective
offault is primarily a means ofreducing social waste, rather than a means of achieving
fairness. Id. at 934-35.
92. See infra notes 93-116 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
94. Henderson, supra note 91, at 934.
95. Holmes, supra note 5, at 186.
96. Holmes, supra note 5, at 186.
97. Holmes, supra note 5, at 186.
98. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 393.140 (1994).
99. See Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 835, 841 (Ohio 1988);
Boyle, supra note 26, at 873; Holmes, supranote 5, at 190.
100. Holmes, supra note 5, at 190; See e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 393.106 (1994).
101. See infranotes 102-03 and accompanying text.
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and thus, places them at a disadvantage in the market.1°2 Given an electric
utility's monopoly in providing electricity, there is no market in which the utility
can be in a disadvantageous position; therefore, there will be no decrease in the
consumption of hazardous products."0 3
Applying strict products liability to electric utilities also fails to serve the
objective of encouraging investment in product safety. 4 In theory,
manufacturers have the same financial incentives to create safe products under
either a negligence or a strict liability regime.'01
However, those advocating strict products liability suggest that
manufacturers escape a significant portion ofnegligence based liability because
a negligence action presents the plaintiff with difficult issues of proof.106
"Knowing that the average plaintiff has difficulty establishing negligence,
manufacturers may be willing to bet on escaping liability, or at least large
judgments, and thus may limit their efforts to reduce products risk."'0
Although manufacturers in other industries may be escaping liability by
relying on the plaintiff's failure to carry the burden of proof, the heavy
regulation of electric utilities should deter this from occurring at an electric
utility."' For example, a Missouri statute provides that the Public Service
Commission can do, inter alia,any ofthe following: examine or investigate the
methods of supplying electricity and order that reasonable improvements which
will best promote the public interest be made, investigate and have access to all
parts of an electric utility's plant, prescribe uniform methods of keeping
accounts, records, books, and memorandum and have access to any employees

102. Henderson, supranote 91, at 933.
103. This is particularly true in the case of the electric utility which not only has
a monopoly, but a monopoly on a necessity.
104. See infra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.

105. Henderson, supra note 91, at 932. "Exposure to liability for negligence will
pressure a rational producer to the point where marginal costs of accident avoidance
equal marginal costs ofaccidents. Negligence law should pressure the producer to invest
optimally in research for hidden hazards, i.e., to the point, but not beyond, where the
marginal expected injury costs equal the marginal costs oftesting. Even ifstrict liability
were imposed on such a producer, no greater investment in research would be made
because it would be cheaper for the producer to insure than to keep testing." Henderson,
supra note 91, at 932 n.58. See generally Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A
Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973).

106. Henderson, supranote 91, at 932. Henderson indicates that manufacturers
may be able to destroy evidence such as adverse test results and frustrate plaintiffs'
attempts to demonstrate that the defendant knew of the hazards. Henderson, supranote

91, at 932.
107. Henderson, supranote 91, at 932.

108. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
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and documents for examination or inspection." ° If the Commission orders
improvements which support the public interest, inspects or prescribes
documentation, and focuses on the methods of an electric company, strict
products liability will not provide a greater incentive for safety than that which
already exists under the regulations. Furthermore, the regulations should prevent
evidence of negligence from disappearing as might be the case in industries
without regulation regarding examination, inspection, and documentation. Thus,
electric companies will not "bet on escaping liability" by practicing less safe
alternatives in hopes of making a larger profit.
Perhaps the most overlooked reason why applying strict products liability
to electricity would not result in a greater investment in safety by electric utilities
is that utilities already supply electricity incredibly safely."' The population of
the United States in 1990 was 248,718,301."' Undoubtedly, almost all of the
population encounters electricity on a daily basis, and each day many are
exposed to electricity for more time than they are exposed to any other
"product.""' 2 Yet, despite its mass consumption and lethal nature, electricity
causes only 1700 deaths each year."' The percentage of people which
electricity injures or kills approaches zero. 14 Electricity is already virtually 100
percent safe." 5 Thus, even if strict products liability were applied to electric
utilities, the utilities would not have an increased incentive to invest in safety
because the
marginal cost could not be justified when compared to the marginal
6
benefit.'

109. Mo. REv. STAT. § 393.140 (1994).
110. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
111. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOKOF FACTS 1997 at 381 (Robert Famighetti,
ed., 1996).
112. Although statistics in this area are unavailable, electricity seems unique in its
pervasiveness. For example, while a homeowner is at work exposing himself to
electricity, his home is also being supplied with electricity.
113. See supranote 5 and accompanying text.
114. 1700/248,709,873 equals approximately .0007%. While accurate statistics
on how many people electricity injures are not available as injuries often go unrecorded,
even if electricity caused 100 times more injuries than it did deaths, the total percentage
of people who encounter electricity who are injured by it would still be only .07%.
115. See supranote 110-14 and accompanying text.
116. Henderson indicates that, in theory, strict liability will provide no greater
incentive to invest in safety than negligence because in either case the manufacturer will
only invest up to the point where the marginal cost of adding extra safety is equal to the
marginal accident costs saved. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. See also
JAMES A. HENDERsON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PRocEss 552-54 (4th ed. 1994).
Henderson states:
Moving from negligence to strict liability in theory will not cause actors to
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Finally, electricity's excellent safety record belies the notion that strict
products liability would be valuable because it would help plaintiffs win cases
where negligence actually existed but could not be proven, because it displays
that there are very few cases in which negligence exists in the first place.

VI. CONCLUSION
Negligence is the dominant regime of American tort law."7 When
compelling policies exist,"I courts lift the general rule of negligence and impose
strict liability. Although these compelling policies generally exist in the area of
products, they do not exist when applied to an electric utility's supply of
electricity." 9 Thus, courts should hold that the supply of electricity is a
"service," rather than a "product," for strict products liability purposes, and base
an electric utility's liability upon negligence.
CHRISTOPHER J. PETRI

act any more carefully. Under negligence, actors will invest a socially
optimal amount in accident avoidance. The costs of accidents that continue
to occur even after such optimal investment-the 'residual' losses not deemed
worth avoiding through further precautions-will remain on the victims of
such accidents. But, even if actors were held strictly liable for all accident
losses, including such residual accident costs, they would not increase their
investment in care. Instead, because the residual losses are, by hypothesis,
cheaper to incur than to prevent, actors under strict liability will simply pay
for such losses (through insurance perhaps) rather than make the additional
investments in safety necessary to avoid them.
Id.at 552-54. This theory would be particularly true if the product is already extremely
safe because at this level ofsafety it becomes very expensive to discover and implement
new safety techniques, while the marginal accident costs cannot be reduced significantly
as they are already very low. In other words, at electricity's level of safety, the residual
losses would be much cheaper to incur than to prevent. Henderson's Table 6-1 displays
why residual losses become so high as the level of safety increases. Id. at 553
117. See JAmE A. HENDERSON, JR. EAL.,THETORTS PROCESS 550 (4th ed. 1994).
118. Compelling policies include the spreading of the cost of losses due to
accidents, providing greater incentives for safety, and reducing the consumption of
hazardous products.
119. See supranotes 93-116 and accompanying text.
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